The Blakean Metaphysic, by Joel Meyer

As true vision perceives the very essence of reality, it cannot help but be metaphysical by nature. The difference with Blake is that, though he identifies different realms of reality, these are really only domains of knowing, making Blake’s metaphysic purely epistemological; indeed, methods of knowing form the philosophic crucible of Blake’s entire worldview, and are thus present in all aspects, symbolic or otherwise.

In order to re-awaken Albion, or the creative humanity complete in itself, we must realize a “spiritualized” mode of seeing, an active epistemic that appears in direct and intended contrast to the passive sense impressions of empirical science. This is reality itself, as Blake affirms: “Imagination is not a State: it is the Human Existence Itself.” The Gospels, and the prophecies found in Ezekiel, Acts, and the Book of Revelation, are all higher forms of this true divine vision, graciously preserved in their purity, and altogether characterize the Biblical tradition that Blake wishes to exhume from its miserable tomb and to once more exalt on high. He ultimately wishes to see “Eternity in a grain of sand, And a heaven in a wild flower”; to see the infinitely beautiful in every single perception: this is precisely what he means by the spiritual, imaginative vision.

Although this is a grand and visually lofty idea, it is hardly the sole, exclusive type of “re-awakening”; it does, however, entail any other individual method, though its form might appear differently. Northrop Frye, the pre-eminent Blake scholar, says that “there are exactly as many realities as there are men”. This leads us to another central idea: The differentiation between “General Forms” and “Minute Particulars”; Blake believes that the former results in a spurious aggregate comprised of an array of particulars assembled by the “tools of Satan”, or “Memory”, and “Ratio”, or fallen reason. This is when the individual loses its particular vitality and is crudely absorbed into the monstrous generality, which cares only for an equality en masse and not for the specific needs of its members.

Blake encounters an essential problem early on when he tries to visualize just how the individual becomes part of the greater “universal Humanity” while yet retaining his identity; some have said of him in regard to this complexity: “Bake is a dualist who wants and tries to be a monist.” Whether he ever truly solves this problem is debatable, but this question is important to keep in mind. For the present, it is to be known that Blake’s most ambitious goal in this regard is to preserve a man’s particular reality whilst according it to the overall humanity, and not losing his identity to abstraction and generalities in the process.

The declaration, “As a man is So he Sees,” helps us in comprehending that subject and object are not two different things but one inseparable reality. If we visualize the external world in terms of our own internal understanding, what is the mundane reality but the physical extension of our own ideas? The old philosophical proverb, esse est percipi, or being is perception, applies immediately to the present context, as nothing really is if it is not attached with a particular identity deriving from our highest sense, viz. imagination. Thus we can see how a proper delineation of the sacred and the profane takes place; when something is spotted and brought into artistic detail by imaginative vision, it is bequeathed with a certain sacrality; and when something is obscure and irrelevant to everything but the sensual, it is deemed illusory and thus profane.

Another important idea related to Blake’s metaphysic / epistemic, returning to the notion of a dualistic monist, is his view of the conditional duality of the physical dimension. Throughout Blake’s work we find hints to a theory of opposites, where they agree and where they conflict, but nowhere is it more thoroughly considered than in his iconic poem, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell. Within the text, Blake posits two seemingly irreconcilable sides or factions that are always opposed; and yet they are equally necessary. The problem that Blake sees is that one of them will overcome the other in power and become absolute, inheriting a tendency to ostracize its opposite in moralistic terms, resulting in a deep “psychological” repression of the conquered faction. Blake makes the attempt to show that neither are inherently Good or Evil, but merely a different side of the same coin, so to speak, and that our progress is inherently linked to the maintenance of these opposites.

This has been a very broad brush-stroke of some gigantic themes, and by no means an exhaustive exposition of “the Blakean metaphysic”; but now the reader will be acquainted with several of Blake’s primary themes, allowing us to fill in the details with much greater ease. In closing, it is remarkable to note the very method Blake uses in his engravings, or corroding away the excess to reveal the imprint, is a direct parallel to Blake’s artistic assault on the philosophical pedantry and the social caprice of his day; it might be said, perhaps, that Blake had learned how to “philosophize with a hammer” before that caustic philologist had even been born…

“But first the notion that man has a body distinct from his soul is to be expunged; this I shall do by printing in the infernal method, by corrosives, which in Hell are salutary and medicinal, melting apparent surfaces away, and displaying the infinite which was hid.”

~ The Marriage of Heaven and Hell

Where I Stand (Subject to Flux)

Here is a collection of the directions toward which I currently lean in the context of various classic philosophical debates. Not terribly deep, I’ll admit, but worth noting for my sake so that I can draw comparisons later on.

• Analytic vs Continental: Continental
• Agnosticism / Atheism vs Theism: Agnosticism (with polytheist tendencies)
• Anti-Naturalism vs Naturalism: Naturalism
• Bundle Theory vs Substance Theory: Bundle Theory
• Determinism vs Libertarianism (Free Will): Hard Determinism / Fatalism (With an interest in non-causal events)
• Direct / Indirect Realism vs Phenomenalism: Phenomenalism
• Dualism vs Non-Dualism: Non-Dualism
• Empiricism vs Rationalism: Empiricism
• Ethical Cognitivism vs Ethical Non-Cognitivism: Ethical Non-Cognitivism
• Nominalism vs Realism / Universalism: Nominalism

I think it’s interesting, and perhaps informative, to note that the pattern here generally seems to fit with one of William James’ “personality types” associated with certain philosophical outlooks. One might describe this pattern of opinions as fairly skeptical/scientific in a number of ways; James describes those who hold to this pattern as wishing to put forth a view of themselves as practical, tough-minded thinkers. I can see the draw of this mask, but I also have a liking for somewhat high, delicate ways of presenting these ideas, particularly the metaphysical ones, at least when such presentation is possible. I have no idea if James is right, but his is an interesting insight nonetheless.

In any case, I have much to learn and there is a long way to go both in the Ancient Philosophy class and the Metaphysics seminar I am currently enrolled in. Then there are always two more years at Kenyon, graduate school (if that’s in the cards), independent reading, life itself. I could end up a Platonist, for all I know! I hope not, though.

Answering an Objection to Hume’s Critique of Causality

David Hume, who along with Berkeley remains the profoundest of empiricists to this day, made a very famous argument against causality.  Essentially, we see events happening one after the other and simply assume necessary connection between them, even though we have no sense impression of such necessary connection in the form of causality.  Causality is a concept we impose on our experience, not something we actually experience.

When we see a billiard ball roll across a table and strike another billiard ball, we see the one ball touch the other ball and then see the other ball roll, but we don’t actually see the causal connection between these events.  The balls could be moved in a similar way by magnets under the table, and in that case the movement of the second ball would not be caused by it’s being struck by the first — yet, the phenomenon would be similar to that that would obtain were the first ball to actually strike the second.  Thus, we cannot actually get any sense experience of causality.

Hume also says for those things in our heads that we have never experienced, such as unicorns, there is an explanation inasmuch as they can be described as composites of other impressions we have experienced.  An objection to Hume’s rejection of causality is that the idea of causality could not have been constituted from a combination of other ideas, that there is no reasonable explanation for why we should have such an idea if we have never had any experience of it (granting Hume’s premise that knowledge comes through experience).

I have a counter-objection to the protest that causality would not even feature in our thoughts if we did not experience it.  Such an objection begs the question by demanding a causal explanation of the presence of the idea of causality in the mind.  It assumes that which it is trying to prove, that there must be some causal reason for the presence of the idea of causality.  It is a meaningless objection therefore.  If causality is an inapplicable concept, which follows when we accept Hume’s premise that knowledge is gained from experience, then there need not be a causal explanation for why the idea of it arises.

The best attempt at salvaging the idea of causality was made by Kant, who described causality like space and time as a category of thought, existing prior to all experience, which allows us to make sense of the raw phenomenal data we perceive.  Again, though, one must presume the necessity of causal explanations, and, thus, the applicability of causation to our understanding of reality, in order to accept this Kantian account.  I would argue an empiricist like Hume, or other phenomenalists such as Nietzsche, need not do this.

Argument Against Essential Qualities

I have had doubts about the reality or meaningfulness of essential qualities for some time now. Yesterday evening, while in my Metaphysics seminar, I thought of an interesting argument against essential qualities. I am sure there are many flaws with the argument, but it still proves somewhat interesting to ponder.

Let’s begin by defining some terms.  I define an essence as all that which distinguishes a thing from all other things.  I define an accidental as a property of a thing that, when changed, does not alter the essence of the thing itself.  An essential quality is a property of an essence — a fact about, or aspect of, an essence.

There is one other description of essential qualities I find helpful.  Essential qualities must distinguish a thing from at least one other thing.  This seems to be a rather non-controversial assertion to make.

We are left then with two possible definitions of what constitutes an essential quality.  The first is that an essential quality is a property that distinguishes a thing from at least one other thing.  The second is that an essential quality is a property that distinguishes a thing from every other thing.  Any other number of things between one and everything seems arbitrary, so a thus third option will be discarded as such.

The first option for what constitutes an essential quality can most likely be discarded, since it would, for example, imply that a certain length or color of hair should be counted as an “essential quality” of a person.  We have a sense that, if there are essential qualities, they should not be so malleable as to render someone a completely different person when such a feature as their hair changes.  So we reject the first definition — id est, that an essential quality is a property that distinguishes a thing from at least one other thing — by means of a kind of reductio ad absurdum; it doesn’t lead directly to a contradiction, but does lead to a result that is likely to be rejected by advocates of the idea of essential qualities.

Thus, we are left with the second option: An essential quality is a property that distinguishes a thing from all other things.  The only difference between an essence and an essential quality, then, is that an essence might be described as a composite of essential qualities, whereas each essential quality refers to only a single property of the thing.

Now consider Adam in the Garden of Eden.  He is the only human in the world; thus, being human is an essential quality of Adam, a thing that distinguishes him from all other things.  Now, however, God puts Adam to sleep, removes his rib, and fashions Eve from it.  No longer is Adam the only human in existence; there is another thing, Eve, which shares the quality of being human.  Adam’s being human, therefore, can no longer be considered an essential quality of his being, by our previously established definition.

This problem leaves us in the awkward situation of having to admit that Adam’s essence — defined as all that distinguishes a thing from all other things — has changed merely by virtue of the introduction of Eve, or that being human was never actually an essential quality of Adam and that he could just as easily have been a baboon while being essentially “the same”.

The first option is absurd, since if a thing’s essence changes the thing no longer exists; it is no longer the same thing.  The second option, though, seems equally absurd.  How could it be that Adam would be “essentially” the same no matter whether he is a human or a baboon?  I doubt any proponent of essential qualities would claim that being human is not a part of a human being’s “essence”.

One way to address this problem would be to claim that Adam has an immaterial soul that could just as easily have been connected to a baboon’s body as to a human’s body, but the problem there is that there is scant evidence for such a thing, at least not through empirical observation, and it could hardly be deduced from known principles unless one presupposes the meaningfulness or reality of essential qualities.  This approach would seem to be begging the question, however.

There are, undoubtedly, many points to this argument that may be assaulted.  I would be interested in any definition of an essential quality that is different from the one I proposed earlier.  Perhaps my definition is necessary but insufficient. It seems one would be hard-pressed to come up with a definition of “essential quality” that does not involve it being a property that somehow distinguishes a thing from at least one other thing, but there could certainly be more to a reasonable definition that I am missing.